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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Following a traffic stop, police discovered 
approximately twenty pounds of heroin in the trunk of the car 
driven by Warren Charles Green, IV. Green appeals his 
resulting conviction, claiming that the traffic stop was both 
instigated and prolonged in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. Finding no constitutional violation on either 




A. Factual Background 
 This case involves three separate traffic stops, all 
performed by Pennsylvania State Trooper Michael Volk, that 
are arguably relevant to Green’s constitutional claims. As a 
drug interdiction officer, Volk’s duties largely consist of 
traveling on the Pennsylvania Turnpike in an unmarked 
cruiser to search for drugs, money, and weapons. Each of the 
stops occurred on the Turnpike in the vicinity of Somerset, 
roughly 70 miles east of Pittsburgh. The first stop involved 
two men with no further direct connection to the case. The 
latter two stops both involved Green. The Government argues 
that information Volk obtained during the first stop helped 
contribute to reasonable suspicion of Green’s criminal 
activity during the final stop, which led to the heroin 
discovery.  
April 3, 2013 
Volk stopped a vehicle traveling eastbound on the 
Pennsylvania Turnpike. This stop did not involve Green, but 
rather two other men who, like Green, are black. The men had 
a dog in their back seat. Volk’s stated reason for the stop was 
for following too closely, but he suspected that the stopped 
vehicle and another vehicle traveling close by were involved 
in drug trafficking. The occupants stated that they were 
traveling to Long Branch, New Jersey, in order to breed the 
dog, which they described as an “American Bully.” Volk’s 
computer was not working at the time, so he let the 
individuals go with a verbal warning. Later that day, Volk 
learned that at least one of the occupants was on federal 
pretrial release for drug violations. 
April 4, 2013 
At approximately 8 a.m. the next day, Volk 
simultaneously pulled over two separate vehicles traveling 
eastbound on the Turnpike. Again, Volk believed that the two 
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cars were travelling together and involved in drug trafficking. 
The stated reasons for the stops were a license plate violation 
and illegal window tinting. Both drivers denied knowing each 
other. The first driver, a white male, informed Volk that he 
was traveling to Baltimore for work. Green drove the second 
vehicle and informed Volk that he was going to Philadelphia 
to see family. When Volk asked Green how long he was 
planning to stay in Philadelphia, Green initially responded, “I 
don’t know. That all depends,” at which point Volk began to 
speak over him, laughing, and asked, “You don’t have to get 
back for work or anything?” Green explained that he owned a 
barbershop, so he had a good amount of flexibility with 
regard to the hours he worked. Nothing else was discussed 
about the planned duration of Green’s trip and the 
conversation diverted to other topics. A check of Green’s 
license revealed that he had multiple prior arrests for drug and 
weapon offenses, though Volk was unaware if Green had any 
prior convictions.  
After several minutes, Volk brought Green to the rear 
of Green’s vehicle and issued a warning for the window tint 
violation. Green told Volk that he had only recently 
purchased the vehicle and that the windows had been tinted 
by the previous owner. Volk then told Green he could 
continue on his way. As Green was walking back to the 
driver’s side of his car, Volk asked him if there was anything 
in the vehicle that should not be there. Green responded that 
there was not. Volk then asked for Green’s consent to search 
the vehicle and Green acceded, eventually signing a waiver. 
Volk searched Green’s vehicle, including the engine 
compartment, for roughly twelve minutes and did not 
discover any contraband. In fact, Green did not have any 
luggage or baggage of any kind in his vehicle. While 
conducting the search, Volk detected the smell of raw 
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marijuana in the trunk compartment and noticed that the trunk 
liner was pulled back. Volk did not discuss any of these 
observations with Green. Following the search, Volk allowed 
Green to continue on his way. Volk also received consent to 
search the other vehicle and similarly uncovered no 
contraband. 
April 5, 2013 
At approximately 10 a.m. the following day, Volk was 
removing debris on the side of the Turnpike and noticed 
Green’s vehicle traveling westbound. By his own admission, 
Volk decided at this point that he would try to find a reason to 
stop Green. Volk followed Green and ascertained his speed 
by “pacing” Green’s vehicle. When pacing, an officer finds 
the speed at which his vehicle remains equidistant from the 
target vehicle in order to assess the target vehicle’s speed. See 
75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3368 (requirements for pacing). Here, 
Volk followed one to two-tenths of a mile behind Green’s car 
for a distance of roughly six-tenths of a mile. The speed limit 
on that portion of the Turnpike was 65 miles per hour. Volk 
determined that Green was traveling 79 miles per hour and 
pulled him over. After walking up to Green’s window, Volk 
feigned surprise, saying, “You again!” in a light-hearted 
manner. When Volk noted that he pulled Green over for 
speeding, Green apologized and said that he had left the 
cruise control on while going down a hill. As Green was 
gathering his license and registration, he asked Volk, “How 
you doin’ today?” Volk replied and then asked Green how he 
was doing, to which Green responded, “I can’t complain. I 
got a dog, so.” Volk then observed a dog in the back of 
Green’s vehicle and believed it was—or at least resembled—
the dog from the April 3 stop. Volk asked Green why he had 
returned from Philadelphia after only one day, despite saying 
the day before that he would be there for “a couple days.” As 
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quoted above, Green did not actually say he would be gone “a 
couple days” during the earlier stop, but that was how Volk 
remembered the previous day’s conversation. In any event, 
Green explained that he was returning from Philadelphia 
because his daughter had just broken her leg, so he had to 
hurry back to take care of her. This conversation lasted about 
forty seconds. 
After returning to his cruiser with Green’s license and 
registration, Volk immediately called a colleague to fill him 
in on the events dating back to April 3. This phone call lasted 
roughly two minutes and had a decidedly jocular tone. Volk 
had already requested backup prior to his initial conversation 
with Green and waited in his vehicle for its arrival. It is 
unclear whether Volk also requested a canine unit at this time. 
About eight minutes after the end of his phone call, and with 
backup not having arrived, Volk called Green to the rear of 
Green’s vehicle.1 Volk again issued Green a warning and 
Green struck up a lengthy conversation about his daughter’s 
injury. During this exchange, both Volk and Green stood at 
the rear of Green’s vehicle observing the dog through the 
back window. Green described the dog’s breed as a “Cane 
Corso” or “Presa Canario,” and related that he had bought the 
dog from a kennel somewhere outside of Philadelphia, though 
he could not recall the name of the exact town. As had 
happened the day before, Volk indicated that Green was free 
to leave, but as Green was walking back to the driver’s door, 
Volk again asked if he could search Green’s vehicle. This 
time, Green apologized and declined, explaining that he was 
in too much of a hurry. Volk then instructed Green to wait in 
his car until further notice. 
                                              
1 The record does not reveal why Volk chose not to 
wait any longer for backup. 
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After approximately fifteen minutes, during which 
there was no meaningful interaction between Volk and Green, 
a canine unit arrived. Green was taken out of his vehicle and 
told to take his dog with him to a safe distance away from the 
police dog.2 A canine sweep of the car resulted in an alert for 
drugs in the trunk. Based on this evidence, Volk obtained a 
search warrant a few hours later. A search of Green’s trunk 
revealed a duffel bag containing roughly 1,000 bricks of 
heroin weighing nearly 20 pounds. 
B. Procedural History 
Green was charged with possession with intent to 
distribute one kilogram or more of heroin. Green filed a 
motion to suppress the heroin as obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. The District Court held an evidentiary 
hearing nearly three years after the original stop, in which 
Volk testified as the only witness. After the District Court 
denied Green’s motion, he pled guilty to the single count, 
preserving the constitutional issues for appeal. Green was 
sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment—the mandatory 
minimum—followed by five years of supervised release.  
II 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 3231, and this Court exercises jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. On an appeal of a denial of a motion to 
suppress, the District Court’s factual findings are reviewed 
for clear error and its legal determinations are subject to 
                                              
2 At this point, Volk performed a patdown of Green. 
Green’s claim that this patdown was unconstitutional is 
without merit. See United States v. Murray, 821 F.3d 386, 
393 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that a suspect’s connection with 




plenary review. United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 237 (3d 
Cir. 2012). We will affirm the District Court’s denial of 
Green’s motion to suppress. Although our reasoning differs in 
some respects from that of the District Court, we may affirm 
on any ground supported by the record. Tourscher v. 
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). 
III 
Green’s constitutional claims require us to answer 
several discrete questions. First, we must assess whether the 
District Court erred when it ruled that the final traffic stop on 
April 5 was supported by reasonable suspicion of a traffic 
violation. If there was no error, we must proceed to determine 
whether the District Court was also correct in its 
determination that the stop was conducted in a constitutional 
manner. Green argues that the stop was prolonged in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. To address this claim, we must 
first decide when the stop was extended, and then determine 
whether, at that point, the extension was justified by a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
A. Initiation of the Traffic Stop 
We turn first to Green’s contention that the April 5 
stop was initiated in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Traffic stops are classified as a type of Terry stop, and may be 
initiated based on a reasonable suspicion that a traffic 
violation has occurred. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 
1683, 1686 (2014); see United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 
F.3d 392, 396–97 (3d Cir. 2006) (adopting reasonable 
suspicion, not probable cause, as the applicable standard). 
Here, Volk paced Green’s vehicle in compliance with the 
relevant Pennsylvania statute and estimated his speed at 79 
miles per hour, 14 miles per hour above the posted limit. 
Conceding these facts, Green nonetheless argues that the 
distance at which Volk conducted the pacing—between one 
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and two-tenths of a mile—was too great to allow for a reliable 
estimate of Green’s speed. We disagree.  
When pacing, the key requirement is maintaining a 
consistent distance with the target vehicle. At the suppression 
hearing, Volk testified that he was able to maintain a constant 
interval between himself and Green. The District Court found 
that Green’s vehicle was some distance from Volk’s, but not 
so far that Volk would have been unable to determine if the 
interval between the two was increasing, decreasing, or 
remaining constant. The dashboard camera footage from 
Volk’s cruiser shows that this factual finding is not clearly 
erroneous. Our confidence in Volk’s assessment is further 
supported by the fact that Green was traveling significantly 
faster than the speed limit allowed. Logically, the more 
excessive a driver’s speed, the less precise a measurement 
must be to establish reasonable suspicion that the driver is 
speeding at least to some degree. See United States v. 
Sowards, 690 F.3d 583, 591–92 (4th Cir. 2012). The 
operative question is whether Volk had a reasonable 
suspicion that Green was speeding, not whether Volk could 
determine Green’s exact speed. The District Court did not err 
in concluding that Volk had a reasonable suspicion that Green 
was speeding, so the stop was justified.3 
B. Extension of the Traffic Stop 
We next consider whether the April 5 traffic stop, 
though “lawful at its inception,” was unreasonably extended 
                                              
3 Green’s argument that the stop was pretextual is both 
true and immaterial. It has long been axiomatic that “a traffic-
violation arrest . . . [is not] rendered invalid by the fact that it 
was ‘a mere pretext for a narcotics search.’” Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996) (quoting United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973)). 
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in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v. Caballes, 
543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). An unreasonable extension occurs 
when an officer, without reasonable suspicion, diverts from a 
stop’s traffic-based purpose to investigate other crimes. 
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015). 
There is no dispute that the April 5 traffic stop was extended 
to facilitate a canine sniff for drugs. What is disputed, 
however, is when this extension occurred, and whether, at 
that moment, Volk possessed reasonable suspicion in order to 
justify the extension. In light of Rodriguez, we must first 
determine when the stop was “measurably extend[ed].” Id. 
(quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009)). 
After determining when the stop was extended—the 
“Rodriguez moment,” so to speak—we can assess whether the 
facts available to Volk at that time were sufficient to establish 
reasonable suspicion that Green was involved in drug 
trafficking.  
As subsequent cases in our sister Circuits have 
demonstrated, the Rodriguez rule is far easier to articulate 
than to apply, and we now find ourselves facing a similar 
difficulty. We ultimately conclude that Rodriguez does not 
provide a clear answer for pinpointing the April 5 “Rodriguez 
moment.” In light of such uncertainty—and solicitous of 
Green’s Fourth Amendment rights—we will err on the side of 
caution and assume the earlier of the two plausible 
“Rodriguez moments” from which to assess reasonable 
suspicion. Because Volk did indeed possess reasonable 
suspicion at this earlier point, Green suffered no 
constitutional injury in the course of the traffic stop. 
The Rodriguez Decision 
Prior to Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held in 
Caballes that a “dog sniff conducted during a . . . lawful 
traffic stop” does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long 
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as the sniff does not result in the stop being “prolonged 
beyond the time reasonably required to complete” its traffic-
based mission. 543 U.S. at 410, 407. Following Caballes, 
lower courts disagreed over whether a de minimis extension 
of a traffic stop to allow time for a sniff would pass 
constitutional muster. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 
(comparing cases). Rodriguez answered this question with a 
clear “no,” holding that, absent reasonable suspicion, any 
“unrelated inquiries [that] measurably extend the duration of 
[a] stop” are unlawful. Id. at 1615 (alterations added and 
omitted) (quoting Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333). In describing 
what inquiries qualify as “unrelated,” Rodriguez drew a 
distinction between “ordinary inquiries incident to” a traffic 
stop, id. (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408), which serve the 
purpose of enforcing the traffic code, and other measures 
aimed at detecting criminal activity more generally. Actions 
like “checking the driver’s license, determining whether there 
are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the 
automobile’s registration and proof of insurance” are in the 
former category of inquiries incident to a traffic stop. Id. A 
dog sniff, being obviously focused on the enforcement of 
drug—not traffic—laws, falls in the latter category and 
cannot, therefore, be performed in a manner that extends the 
duration of the stop absent reasonable suspicion. Id. 
The task of determining when a traffic stop is 
“measurably extended” is more difficult than Rodriguez’s 
language might suggest. This difficulty stems, at least in part, 
from the particular facts of both Caballes and Rodriguez. In 
Caballes, the trooper making the stop radioed dispatch to 
report his actions. This transmission happened to be 
overheard by a drug interdiction officer, who immediately 
traveled to the scene and conducted the dog sniff before any 
citation had been issued. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406. In 
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Rodriguez, by contrast, the officer who initiated the stop 
already had a drug dog in his vehicle. 135 S. Ct. at 1612. For 
safety reasons, however, he issued a warning for speeding and 
then waited for backup to arrive before conducting the dog 
sniff. Id. at 1613. The Court declared the former stop 
constitutional and the latter not. Neither case directly 
addressed what pre-citation conduct might constitute an 
impermissible extension.  
Justice Alito, dissenting in Rodriguez, criticized the 
Court’s decision as “impractical[] and arbitrary,” and 
lamented that the constitutional question appeared to turn, 
“not [on] the length of the stop, but simply . . . the sequence 
in which [the officer] chose to perform his tasks.” 135 S. Ct. 
at 1623, 1624 (Alito, J., dissenting). The majority disclaimed 
this reading of its opinion, stating that “[t]he critical question 
. . . is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the 
officer issues a ticket . . . but whether conducting the sniff 
‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—‘the stop’” Id. at 1616 
(majority opinion). On this “critical question,” however, 
Rodriguez’s language can be interpreted in a variety of ways. 
Id. In describing an extension as anything that “adds time to,” 
id., or “measurably extend[s],” id. at 1615, a stop, the Court 
seems to imply that nearly anything an officer does outside 
the valid, traffic-based inquiries will be unconstitutional. Yet, 
other language in the opinion suggests a more forgiving 
approach toward non-traffic-based actions. This ambiguity is 
brought to the fore with a pair of adjoining sentences: “An 
officer . . . may conduct certain unrelated checks during an 
otherwise lawful traffic stop. But . . . he may not do so in a 
way that prolongs the stop . . . .” Id. (citation omitted). Left 
unexplained is how a police officer could possibly perform 
multiple tasks simultaneously without adding any time to a 
stop. While the majority makes clear that, contra Justice 
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Alito, sequence is not dispositive, id. at 1616, Rodriguez 
provides less clarity regarding what exactly is dispositive 
when evaluating an officer’s pre-citation conduct.  
In a more general sense, Justice Alito’s concern was 
that the Court’s attempt to craft a clear rule—no measurable 
extensions—was impractical in light of the factual complexity 
inherent in traffic stops. Id. at 1625 (Alito, J., dissenting). For 
this reason, Justice Alito favored a more flexible 
reasonableness standard to better account for the practical 
realities of traffic stops, and warned that the Court’s ruling 
would invite arbitrary and unpredictable results. Id. at 1624. 
A survey of post-Rodriguez appellate decisions reveals that 
Justice Alito’s concerns were prophetic. The Rodriguez rule, 
though clear in its formulation, has proved less precise where 
the rubber meets the road. 
Post-Rodriguez Decisions 
In several recent decisions, our sister Circuits have 
adopted starkly divergent interpretations of Rodriguez. 
Several have applied Rodriguez’s language quite rigidly, 
holding that any diversion from a stop’s traffic-based mission 
is unlawful absent reasonable suspicion. In United States v. 
Gomez, for example, an officer stopped a vehicle for speeding 
and running red lights.  877 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2017). When 
the officer first approached the vehicle, the driver asked the 
officer why he had been stopped, and the officer responded 
that he was conducting a heroin investigation and that he had 
observed the driver commit numerous traffic violations. Id. 
The Second Circuit determined that, by referencing the drug 
investigation, the officer unconstitutionally detoured from the 
traffic-based mission of the stop “[f]rom the moment” the 
conversation began. Id. at 91. In United States v. Evans, an 
officer initiated a traffic stop and conducted a vehicle records 
check, a license check, and an outstanding warrants check, all 
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of which came back clean. 786 F.3d 779, 782–83 (9th Cir. 
2015). One of these checks, however, revealed that the 
stopped driver had a felony record. Id. at 783. Accordingly, 
the officer requested a check to verify that the driver was 
properly registered at the address that he had provided. Id. 
The Ninth Circuit ruled that, while the first two checks were 
permissible, the ex-felon registration check, not being directly 
relevant to the traffic stop, unconstitutionally extended the 
stop under Rodriguez. Id. at 786. 
Other Circuits have applied Rodriguez more leniently, 
evaluating police actions by something more akin to a 
reasonableness standard. In United States v. Collazo, the 
Sixth Circuit found no constitutional violation because “most 
of the questions” asked by the officer were related to the 
traffic stop, “and none of them extended the traffic stop 
beyond a reasonable time.” 818 F.3d 247, 257–58 (6th Cir. 
2016) (citing Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615), cert. denied, 137 
S. Ct. 169 (2016). More categorically, the Seventh Circuit 
held in United States v. Walton that “[i]t was permissible for 
[the sole officer on-scene] to ask [the driver and passenger] 
questions unrelated to the traffic violations,” 827 F.3d 682, 
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687 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 407 (2016), 
which undoubtedly extended the stop.4 
As these examples demonstrate, Caballes and 
Rodriguez are difficult to apply beyond their facts, which has 
resulted in inconsistent application in the lower courts. 
Where, as in the present case, an officer arguably prolongs a 
traffic stop before issuing a citation, these precedents serve as 
an uncertain guide. What we know is that an officer may 
“conduct certain unrelated checks,” but not “in a way that 
prolongs the stop.” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. 
Applying Rodriguez 
 This case presents many of the same ambiguities 
highlighted above. There can be no doubt that Volk 
measurably extended the traffic stop when, after issuing 
Green a warning citation, he instructed Green to wait in his 
car indefinitely. The key question is whether the stop was 
measurably extended at an earlier point—that is, whether the 
“Rodriguez moment” instead occurred when Volk returned to 
his vehicle after his brief initial conversation with Green and 
made an unrelated phone call to his colleague. If it did, then 
nothing later in the stop can inform our reasonable suspicion 
                                              
4 Even in traffic stop cases where courts have found no 
Fourth Amendment violations, several dissenting opinions 
have voiced the more restrictive interpretation of Rodriguez. 
See United States v. Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d 407, 419 (8th 
Cir. 2017) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (arguing that “even brief[]” 
questioning unrelated to the traffic stop must be supported by 
reasonable suspicion); United States v. Hill, 852 F.3d 377, 
385 (4th Cir. 2017) (Davis, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
“every minute” an officer spent seeking to confirm a 
passenger’s identity unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop). 
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analysis. This includes, most significantly, the conversation 
that occurred when Volk issued the citation to Green. 
Under a restrictive reading of Rodriguez, it seems clear 
that Volk’s actions following the initial conversation with 
Green, particularly the phone call to his colleague, added time 
to the traffic stop and constituted an extension. See Gomez, 
877 F.3d at 90–91. This phone call was focused on Volk’s 
suspicions about drug trafficking, not speeding. At the 
suppression hearing, Volk conceded that, by the time he made 
this call, he was intent on searching Green’s vehicle and no 
longer concerned with the moving violation.5  
On the other hand, there are sound reasons in favor of 
the more lenient approach followed by several Circuits. To 
start, this short phone call, though unrelated to the traffic stop, 
was not shown to have measurably prolonged the stop, which 
took little more than ten minutes from its inception to the 
issuance of the warning. Other courts have found that phone 
calls requesting canine assistance are not measurable 
extensions, United States v. Hill, 852 F.3d 377, 384 (4th Cir. 
2017), though this conclusion is far from obvious under the 
reasoning of Rodriguez. Additionally, at the time Volk made 
the phone call he was apparently still waiting for backup, 
                                              
5 When asked about this portion of the stop, Volk 
testified as follows: 
Q. At this point you are focused on “I am searching this car, 
right?” 
A. I would like to, yes. 
Q. This is not a moment about giving a warning for a 






which raises its own set of considerations. Rodriguez 
acknowledged the danger to police officers inherent in traffic 
stops, and found no constitutional injury where an officer 
takes “negligibly burdensome precautions in order to 
complete his [traffic] mission safely.” 135 S. Ct. at 1616. By 
contrast, “safety precautions taken in order to facilitate” 
investigation of other crimes are not justified as part of a 
routine traffic stop. Id. Assuming Volk’s request for backup 
was motivated by safety concerns inherent to the traffic stop, 
then any actions taken while waiting for backup to arrive, 
including the phone call, did not add to the “time reasonably 
required to complete the mission.” Id. at 1615 (alteration 
omitted) (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407). Rodriguez 
would seem to suggest that the validity of Volk waiting for 
backup turns on his motivation for making the request—
traffic-based or otherwise—but even this inquiry strikes us as 
rather arbitrary. We doubt very much that Volk’s motivation 
can be distilled to a single concern rather than a hazy 
constellation of factors confronting an officer in such a 
situation. Of course, Volk ultimately chose not to wait for 
backup to arrive before reengaging with Green, which adds 
still greater complexity to the analysis.  
In light of the uncertainty in applying Rodriguez to the 
present facts, we believe that the prudent course is to err on 
the side of caution and proceed on the assumption—not 
conclusion—that the “Rodriguez moment” occurred 
immediately after Volk’s initial conversation with Green. 
Accordingly, we will assess reasonable suspicion based only 
on the facts known to Volk at that time. Because we conclude 
that Volk did possess reasonable suspicion at this moment, 
there will be no need to address the possible implications of a 
later “Rodriguez moment.”  
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C. Reasonable Suspicion 
We now ask whether, at our assumed “Rodriguez 
moment,” Volk possessed reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. In speaking of reasonable suspicion, our precedents 
describe more than define the term, which the Supreme Court 
has characterized as an “elusive concept.” United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). Reasonable suspicion is 
more than “a mere hunch . . . [but] considerably less than . . . 
a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than . . . 
probable cause.” Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Cortez, 449 
U.S. at 417; and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). 
Reasonable suspicion requires only “‘a particularized and 
objective basis’ for suspecting . . . criminal activity,” Ornelas 
v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (quoting Cortez, 
449 U.S. at 417–418), and should not be derived from 
characteristics common to the “vast majority of innocent” 
individuals, Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 494 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
In applying this standard, courts invoke several 
common themes. First, reasonable suspicion must always be 
evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. Cortez, 449 
U.S. at 417. Accordingly, courts have consistently refused to 
adopt per se rules declaring a particular factor sufficient or 
insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. See Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126–27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(agreeing with the Court’s rejection of a per se rule regarding 
flight from police). Second, when assessing the totality of the 
circumstances, courts recognize the particular ability of law 
enforcement officers, based on training and experience, “to 
make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative 
information available to them that ‘might well elude an 
untrained person.’” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 
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(2002) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418). Third, and 
consistent with the totality of the circumstances approach, 
reasonable suspicion cannot be defeated by a so-called 
“divide-and-conquer” analysis, whereby each arguably 
suspicious factor is viewed in isolation and plausible, 
innocent explanations are offered for each. District of 
Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018). In Terry 
itself, the Court found there was reasonable suspicion to 
justify the temporary seizures even though each factor relied 
on by the officer, viewed in isolation, might have seemed 
perfectly innocent. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (citing Terry, 392 
U.S. at 22).  
The Prior Stop and Search 
    Applying this standard to the present case, our first 
challenge is determining the constitutional significance of the 
first encounter between Green and Volk on April 4. During 
that stop, Green consented to a search of his vehicle, which 
failed to uncover any contraband. The Government argues 
that the unsuccessful nature of the April 4 search is 
essentially irrelevant to the question of reasonable suspicion 
on April 5. Green counters that, because he consented to the 
April 4 search and was found free of contraband, no 
information from the search could be used to support 
reasonable suspicion on April 5. Essentially, Green argues 
that the April 4 search gave him a clean slate moving 
forward. In support, Green cites United States v. Peters, 10 
F.3d 1517 (10th Cir. 1993), which likewise included multiple 
traffic stops in relatively quick succession. The District Court, 
perhaps seeking to avoid this thorny issue, purported to 
conduct an independent analysis of the April 5 facts alone. In 
reality, however, the District Court’s analysis incorporated 
several facts from the preceding two days. For instance, the 
District Court found Green’s travel on April 5 to be 
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suspicious, but could have only reached this conclusion by 
relying on Green’s April 4 statements about his travel plans. 
 The present case is easily distinguishable from Peters. 
There, an officer pulled over the defendant and his passenger 
for erratic driving in a rented moving truck. The officer 
suspected that Peters was transporting drugs, and received 
consent to search his truck. This search failed to uncover any 
contraband and the officer sent Peters on his way. Concerned 
that his search had been inadequate, the officer radioed his 
headquarters about the situation. This led to Peters again 
being pulled over a few hours down the road, at which point a 
different officer uncovered evidence that Peters was present 
in the country illegally. The Tenth Circuit ruled that this 
evidence should have been suppressed because the second 
stop was unconstitutionally premised on the same factors that 
justified the initial stop. Id. at 1522–23.  
In Green’s case, roughly twenty-six hours elapsed 
between the two traffic stops, as opposed to the four or five 
hour interval in Peters. In addition, the nature of Green’s 
suspected crime—drug trafficking—made it entirely plausible 
for Green to have acquired drugs during the intervening time 
period. In Peters, by contrast, the officers all but knew that 
the suspect had driven uninterrupted between the two traffic 
stops. Id. at 1520. In fact, they relied on this assumption to 
predict Peters’ location for the second stop. Id. Those officers 
could not have reasonably suspected that Peters acquired 
contraband between the two stops. Nor was that the point; the 
second search was simply a redo of the first. Finally, in Peters 
there was no independent basis for making the second traffic 
stop. Id. at 1523. Here, Green’s speeding provided a 
legitimate justification for the April 5 stop.  
Given these substantial differences, we see no 
reason—constitutional or otherwise—to follow Peters and 
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exclude from our analysis information gained during the 
April 4 stop. It bears repeating: reasonable suspicion is based 
on the totality of the circumstances, i.e., “the whole picture.” 
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417. Categorically excluding a large 
swath of evidence is quite the opposite of considering “the 
whole picture.” Incidentally, this case illustrates that the 
totality of the circumstances approach does not inherently 
benefit either side. For instance, although our analysis 
appropriately considers the fact that Volk detected the smell 
of raw marijuana emanating from Green’s trunk on April 4, 
we also consider as strong evidence the fact that Green’s 
vehicle was searched and contained no contraband. “[T]he 
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
‘reasonableness’ . . . .” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 
U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (quoting Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 
U.S. 11, 13 (1999) (per curiam)). In our view, a reasonable 
officer in Volk’s position, rather than excluding certain 
evidence, would consider all of the facts available to him and 
accord each its due weight. In evaluating his actions, the 
Constitution requires that we do likewise. 
Reasonable Suspicion Factors 
 As noted above, when evaluating reasonable suspicion 
a court’s task is to assess the situation as a whole. 
Nevertheless, in explaining our analysis it will often be 
beneficial, for the sake of clarity, to explain each factor’s 
relative weight in establishing reasonable suspicion. In 
accordance with our Rodriguez analysis, we will only 
consider those facts known to Volk at the time he completed 
his conversation with Green at the beginning of the April 5 
stop. We conclude that Volk possessed a reasonable suspicion 
that Green was engaged in criminal activity. This conclusion 
is based on three primary factors: (1) Green’s misleading 
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statements regarding his travel, (2) the smell of marijuana in 
Green’s trunk, and (3) Green’s criminal history.6 
1. Green’s Misleading Statements 
 Shortly after being stopped on April 4, Green related 
to Volk that he was traveling to Philadelphia to visit family. 
Volk asked Green how long he was staying, to which Green 
responded, “I don’t know. That all depends.” Volk 
immediately began to laugh and, speaking over Green, asked 
“You don’t have to get back for work or anything?” Green 
responded that he was a barber, so his hours were fairly 
flexible. Roughly twenty-six hours later, Volk pulled Green 
over again as he returned from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh. 
Based on these facts, the District Court concluded that 
Green’s statements “about his travels to Philadelphia were 
inconsistent and contradictory,” and thus contributed to 
Volk’s reasonable suspicion.  
 As an initial matter, we note that nothing in Green’s 
statement to Volk on April 4 was logically inconsistent with 
his April 5 return. Green’s statement indicated that his trip 
was for an indeterminate length of time, which obviously 
does not foreclose a one-day turnaround. Contradictory or 
inconsistent statements may contribute to reasonable 
suspicion, United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 459 (3d Cir. 
2003), but an incomplete statement is not necessarily 
contradictory or inconsistent. For all we know, Green’s 
complete, uninterrupted statement would have been, “I don’t 
know. That all depends. Probably tomorrow, but maybe the 
next day.” The fact that Green did not provide a full statement 
                                              
6 Because these factors were sufficient to establish 
reasonable suspicion, we will not analyze what, if any, 
inferences could be drawn from the dog in Green’s car. 
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about his travel plans limits, but does not defeat, our reliance 
on this factor. 
Though not strictly contradictory, Green’s statements 
concerning his travel were sufficiently confusing so as to 
meaningfully contribute to reasonable suspicion. While not 
logically irreconcilable with his earlier statement, Green’s 
travel was nonetheless suspicious. See United States v. 
Benoit, 730 F.3d 280, 285–86 (3d Cir. 2013) (premising 
reasonable suspicion on inconsistent statements regarding the 
purpose and destination of voyage). In the context of a cross-
state trip to visit family for the first time in a while, the 
answer “I don’t know. That all depends,” is not how someone 
would normally characterize the duration of a trip that could 
possibly last only a few hours. More to the point, we cannot 
say that Volk was unreasonable in believing that Green’s 
April 4 statement was at least in tension with an April 5 
return. 
In our mind, however, the more significant suspicion 
arose, not from Green’s quick turnaround, but his own 
statements on April 5. While Green was looking for his 
license and registration at the beginning of the April 5 stop, 
Volk asked him how he was doing and Green replied, “I can’t 
complain. I got a dog, so.” Only after Volk alluded to their 
conversation the day before—“I thought you were staying out 
a couple days?”—did Green say he needed to rush back to 
Pittsburgh because of his daughter’s broken leg.7 Volk was 
justified in viewing Green’s shifting statements with 
mounting skepticism. If it was true that Green’s family visit 
                                              
7 The fact that Green did not challenge Volk’s 
presumption regarding the intended duration of his trip 




had been cut short due to his daughter suffering a serious 
injury, it is hard to imagine him responding to Volk’s 
question—“How are you?”—with such a blasé answer—“I 
can’t complain. I got a dog, so.” Moreover, Green had already 
been informed that he was stopped for speeding, so it is 
highly suspicious that he would not immediately offer his 
daughter’s purported injury as an explanation for his rushing 
home. Instead, Green’s initial explanation for speeding was 
simply that he had left his cruise control on while going down 
a hill. Green’s puzzling responses provided a reasonable basis 
to believe that he was lying about his travels and contributed 
to Volk’s reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.   
2. The Smell of Marijuana 
 During the consensual search of Green’s car on April 
4, Volk detected the smell of raw marijuana in the trunk. Volk 
was unable to locate the source of the smell, and the car was 
otherwise free of contraband. “It is well settled that the smell 
of marijuana alone . . . may establish not merely reasonable 
suspicion, but probable cause.” United States v. Ramos, 443 
F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2006). Green, however, argues that the 
unsuccessful search on April 4 eliminated any probative value 
of the odor. We disagree. While the fact that no marijuana 
was found on April 4 is certainly a relevant consideration, it 
does not preclude our—or Volk’s—consideration of this 
evidence in support of reasonable suspicion on April 5.  
The odor of marijuana in a car “can ‘be evidence of the 
most persuasive character,’” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586 n.5 
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948)), 
and is not an attribute shared by “a very large category of 
presumably innocent travelers,” Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 
438, 441 (1980) (per curiam). The absence of actual 
marijuana on April 4 mitigates, but does not eliminate, the 
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probative value of this evidence.8 We agree with the 
reasoning in Peters that, having conducted a prior search, the 
officer could not justify a subsequent search absent additional 
evidence. 10 F.3d at 1522–23. But here, the April 5 stop was 
independently justified and there was additional evidence to 
support reasonable suspicion. In this context, we find no basis 
in law or logic to prohibit consideration of the marijuana odor 
merely because Green was not transporting drugs the day 
before. Reasonable suspicion must be grounded in “the 
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). The 
smell of marijuana is one such “practical consideration” 
familiar to an officer with Volk’s experience in the field. The 
Fourth Amendment does not demand the kind of cognitive 
contortions that would be required for Volk to ignore highly 
probative evidence of drug activity in deciding whether he 
had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. Volk was 
                                              
8 Our analysis would be different if, for example, Volk 
had seen something he believed to be marijuana but turned 
out to be some other leafy substance. See Karnes, 62 F.3d at 
496. In that situation, later investigation would have 
“exhausted” the validity of the earlier suspicion. Peters, 10 
F.3d at 1522. Here, the smell of marijuana suggested that 
Green had recently transported drugs. The absence of drugs at 
any particular moment in no way foreclosed this inference.  
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justified in relying on this odor as evidence of criminal 
activity on April 5.9 
3. Green’s Criminal History 
 During the April 4 stop, Volk conducted a records 
check and discovered that Green had multiple prior arrests for 
drug and firearm violations. Volk did not learn how those 
arrests were ultimately resolved or whether Green had any 
convictions. Though a criminal record, much less an arrest 
record, is not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, it is 
a valid factor. United States v. Mathurin, 561 F.3d 170, 177 
(3d Cir. 2009). As we have previously noted, “the use of prior 
arrests and convictions to aid in establishing probable cause is 
not only permissible, but is often helpful.” United States v. 
Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1207 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted) 
(collecting cases). This utility is enhanced when the prior 
offenses relate to the crime being investigated. Id. Particularly 
given the other factors already discussed, Volk was amply 
justified in considering Green’s drug arrests in assessing 
reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking on April 5. 
IV 
                                              
9 Following oral argument, Green brought to our 
attention a study raising questions about the reliability of 
individuals’ ability to detect marijuana based on odor. 
Appellant Letter of Oct. 30, 2017 (citing Richard L. Doty, 
Thomas Wudarski, David A. Marshall and Lloyd Hasting, 
Marijuana Odor Perception: Studies Modeled From 
Probable Cause Cases, 28 Law and Human Behavior 223, 
224 (2004)). While interesting, the study’s tentative 
conclusions do not provide a sufficient basis for us to 
overturn the District Court’s factual finding that “a smell of 
raw marijuana was emanating from the trunk area” of Green’s 
car. App. 8. 
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Stepping back from these individual factors and 
considering the “whole picture,” our question remains a fairly 
straight forward one. After the conversation at the start of the 
April 5 traffic stop, did Volk possess reasonable suspicion 
that Green was engaged in criminal activity? At that moment, 
Volk reasonably believed that Green had provided several 
misleading statements about his travel, he knew that Green’s 
trunk carried the odor of marijuana, and he knew that Green 
had several prior arrests for drug and firearm violations. This 
evidence of criminal activity was tempered by the fact that, 
only one day prior, Green consented to a search of his 
vehicle, which was found free of contraband. Reasonable 
minds may disagree over the extent to which the results of 
this search counteracted the various indicia of criminality, but 
that is precisely the point. Whatever the effect of the prior 
search, it was not so sanitizing as to make Volk’s suspicion of 
Green the following day unreasonable. We conclude that 
Volk had a “particularized and objective” basis for suspecting 
that Green was engaged in criminal activity on April 5, 
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417, so extending the traffic stop to 
facilitate a dog sniff was permissible, Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 
1615. 
For the reasons explained above, we will affirm the 
decision of the District Court.  
